Nevertheless, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods.
Four different and similar basic approaches that arise resulting from the problem of regress solution proposals brought by foundationalism, compatibilism, externalism and internalism will be analyzed. In this article, the problem of epistemic regress which is emerging in the contemporary period will be discussed by examining the perspectives of tradition and contemporary epistemology. On the other hand the solution suggestions developed for this problem, which is shown as a threat factor for the knowledge in point, don’t seem sufficient. ) epistemology is the problem of epistemic regress that is a problem of justification. In this respect, Undoubtedly one of the greatest problem of contemporary (. The value of our beliefs and its epistemic justifiability are being examined through this problem. The Problem of Epistemic Regress in Contemporary Epistemology and The Adequacy of Improved Solution Suggestions One of the main problems of epistemology whether our beliefs about the world are correct or not, that is to say, it’s the problem of whether we have suitable reasons or not to think that we have the enough knowledge. For each, certain problems can be raised by employing foundationalist arguments in order to arrive at the conclusion that in spite of his astute reasoning, Klein’s objection is insufficient to rule out foundationalism as a possible solution to the Regress Problem. This paper responds to Klein’s objection to foundationalism, the crucial reasons for which he offers in several of his works concerning infinitism and the Regress Problem: i) that foundationalism inevitably leads either to arbitrariness or to the continuation of the regress of reasons ii) that a proposition continuously enhanced by reasons has more epistemic warrant than a proposition supported by a chain of reasons which ends at basic beliefs, and iii) that basic beliefs are not tantamount to fully justified beliefs. ) only raise problems for the viability of the three contenders but, more so, definitively invalidate them as equally possible solutions. Klein’s successful effort in reviving the often-dismissed solution and further advancing it as the sole solution to the Regress Problem cannot be ignored as he finds it necessary to not (.
Since the resurgence of infinitism in contemporary epistemology, Peter Klein has been consistent in providing arguments against the three other possible solutions (i.e., foundationalism, coherentism, skepticism) to the Regress Problem, which in turn is a key aspect of the justification condition for the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. If it is right that grounding is involved in the epistemic regress, this points the way forward both for epistemologists and metaphysicians, revealing the prospects of solutions to the epistemic regress problem while providing grounding advocates with yet another example of grounding with which to theorize.
I argue that the relation that generates the epistemic regress is a grounding relation, showing that grounding can make sense of proposals by epistemic foundationalists and charting the course for similar applications to epistemic coherentism and epistemic infinitism. ) the epistemic regress problem in terms of grounding. In this paper, I attempt one such application, making sense of (. The contemporary conversation has now turned to a new metaphysical notion – grounding – opening the way to a fresh wave of insights by bringing grounding into epistemology. Modal analyses were applied within epistemology, yielding sensitivity and safety theories of knowledge as well as counterfactual accounts of the basing relation. Modal metaphysics consumed much of the philosophical discussion at the turn of the century, yielding a number of epistemological insights.
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